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21 INTRODUCTION
Understanding the agency relationship between physician and patients is critical to the health
economy. Most of the focus in the literature has been on whether physicians act as perfect agents for
their patients, or if, alternatively, they can succeed in convincing their patients to act in a way that also
benefits themselves, i.e. inducing demand for their services. Typically we would expect that an increase
in supply would lower price, but that is not necessarily the case if physicians can induce demand.
Furthermore, physicians should supply fewer services if they are paid less per service, but again, this
would not be the case if demand inducement were in place. This problem is endemic to the health
economy. It affects both the competitive allocation of services and, to a larger extent, health insurance
markets. Once insurance is in place, physicians might induce demand on patients that are even less
price-sensitive.
The “induced-demand” model, as that of McGuire and Pauly (1991), states that in the face of
negative income shocks, physicians may exploit their agency relationship with patients by providing
excessive care. The underlying hypothesis of such models is as follows: physicians derive utility from
income and leisure, and disutility from inducing demand for unnecessary services. The disutility may
arise from ethical considerations or from reputation effects. In this context, when income is tailored to
specific procedures, physicians will exploit their agency relation with patients to perform more
remunerative procedures if the marginal benefit of a specific procedure outweighs the associated
marginal costs.
Income shocks may arise from different sources. A first source is variations in the
physician/population density across areas: increased density lowers the income of existing stock of
physicians, and it will lead to increased utilization of medical procedures in an inducement-type model.
Income shocks may also emerge as the consequence of an exogenous change in demand due to
epidemiological shifts, evolution of needs, variation in tastes. However the most common source is
variation in fees paid to physicians, generally by government payers. This type of income shocks is
generally accompanied by substitution as well as income effects: reducing the fees of the more
remunerative procedure might lead to both an increase (income effect) and a reduction (substitution
effect) in its adoption. The inducement model has traditionally been tested by assessing how these three
alternative changes in the environment facing physicians affect the utilization of medical procedures.
3Each of these testing strategies faces important problems. Studies that use physician density
changes to proxy for income shocks [see Fuchs (1978) or Cromwell and Mitchell (1986)] suffer from
omitted variables problems.1 An area may feature both higher procedure utilization and more
physicians, regardless of the extent of demand inducement, because of the lack of control for variable
correlated with taste for medical interventions, like the average coinsurance rate in the area. Concerning
demand changes, these are quite difficult to measure. Moreover they take place with a very slow pace
thus leading to problems of control for concomitant changes. Finally, fee changes2 cannot properly
identify supply responses because, as far as substitution and income effects go in opposite directions,
there may be inducement, but these two effects may simply be cancelling; moreover, there may be a
concurrent demand response to changing prices.
A large body of evidence and econometric work is available upon demand induction in surgical
procedures. In this context cesarean section is probably the most studied procedure. C-section is an
increasingly adopted technology for birth; it is more expensive and therefore more generously
reimbursed than natural delivery; it is clinically less appropriate than natural delivery and therefore
ethical and professional rewards do matter in this context.
Tussing and Wojotowycz (1992), examining New York data, find no correlation between
obstetricians/gynecologists density and cesarean delivery rates. However, such a study suffers from the
possibility that omitted regional differences are correlated both with higher obstetricians/gynecologists
density and cesarean utilization.3
Gruber and Owings (1996) test the demand induction model using an exogenous change in the
financial environment facing obstetricians/gynecologists: declining fertility in the United States. Declining
fertility acts as purely exogenous income reduction. They argue that the fall in fertility over the 1970-
1982 period led obstetricians/gynecologists to substitute from normal childbirth towards a more highly
                                                
1 For criticisms of this approach see Phelps (1986).
2 Rice (1984) provides the strongest evidence for induced-quantity increase in response to
Medicare fee reduction in Colorado. A similar study by Hurley, Labelle and Rice (1990) for Ontario found
mixed responses to fee changes across procedures. Evidence from the experience of the US and Canada
offers a similarly mixed picture of the role of induced demand.
3 This general criticism is supported by the evidence built by Dranove and Wehner (1994).
Mimicking the Cromwell and Mitchell (1986) methodology, they found evidence that obstetricians density
appears to induce births.
4reimbursed alternative technology, c-section. Fertility fell by 13.5 percent during the period and
cesarean utilization increased by over 240%. They find evidence of a strong correlation between
within-state declines in fertility and within-state increase in c-section utilization, even if the general
fertility decrease can explain only a small part of the overall growth in c-section utilization. These results
suffer from the lack of control for changes in the structure of demand4, technology, cost, reimbursement
schemes and styles of practice.
Concerning c-section responses to fee and reimbursement changes Strafford (1990), examining
c-section rates by payment source in a sample of California hospitals, finds that these are higher for the
privately insured than for Medicaid patients - the first being more generously reimbursed than the
second. However it seems that self selection problems strongly affect the consistency of estimated
effects in this context. Keeler and Fok (1996) study the impact of an insurance reform under California
Blue Cross that equalized fees for natural and cesarean delivery, a relative decline in cesarean fees of
21%. Using data from before and after the reform the authors find only a modest 0.7% reduction in c-
section rates, which indicates a very small response to fee changes. As far as the average physician in
their sample gets a large proportion of his income from the Health Plan that implemented the reform,
income effect and the implied demand inducement should be very large. This seems to support the idea
that when substitution effect is present it tends to confound the income (inducement) effects. Therefore,
demand induction, even when income effect is extremely strong might be almost completely
counterbalanced, and therefore obscured, by substitution effect5.
The aim of this paper is to provide an enhanced empirical test of the demand induction model
addressing the abovementioned limitations. We use an almost unique natural experiment on fees
reduction which took place in an italian region, Emilia-Romagna, between 1997 and 1998. Fees for all
delivery procedures where reduced by 20% by the regional financing authority in order to reduce
                                                
4 For example, reduction in fertility might be accompanied by an increase in the degree of risk
adversion among women in childbirth. Provided that the natural delivery is more risky, both for the mother
and the child, we could observe an increase in c-section delivery even in absence of any induction.
5 In a similar framework Gruber, Kim and Mayzlin (1999) provide empirical support to the
obscuring effect of inducement behaviour due to substitution effects. They show that when income
effects from fee changes are dominated by substitution effects, as it is with Medicaid insured,
reimbursement increase of cesarean section can cause a real increase in the intensity with which
Medicaid women in childbirth are treated.
5regional outlays without inducing any change in hospital incentives for specific procedures. This fees
reduction allows us to measure a pure income effect not affected by the counterbalancing impact of
substitution effect.
We develop an extended version of demand induction model in the Newhouse (1970) and Evans
(1974) tradition. A major limitation in these models is due to the homogeneity of patient types.
Physicians do not account for any difference in patient riskiness, so that inducement is implicitly
assumed not to differ across patients. This restriction imposes to evaluate the presence of demand
induction on sample averages, and does not allow for a more comprehensive evaluation of demand
induction on sample representative patient types. We remove this restriction by considering a discrete
distribution of patients into classes of risk. In our context, a patient can choose between two main
hospital types, public and private, which differ according to the way they are financed: public are fixed
budgeted, private get reimbursed according to tariffs per Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG). We draw
some new testable implications concerning the relative intensity of demand induction across risk classes.
Briefly, these concern the comparison of inducement behaviour across different  hospital types at a
given point in time, the evaluation of the inducement behaviour resulting from an exogenous income
shock, and the relative amount of inducement across risk classes.
In order to perform the corresponding empirical tests on inducement behaviour, we need first to
set up a proper econometric model for the probability of c-section associated to the two types of
hospitals, controlling for individual characteristics and risk factors. We follow Gruber and Owings
(1996) and insert in a probit model explaining the c-section probability, a hospital type dummy. This is
intended to capture some fixed, unobserved differences in style of practice, professionalism and
technical endowments. However, as far as the utility patients attach to a given hospital type is
correlated with the utility associated to a cesarean delivery, we cannot assume that hospital type
dummies are exogenous for the parameters of the c-section probability model. In other words, a self-
selection process is likely to occur, which would allocate the women in the two different types of
hospital according to unobservable characteristics which could be among the determinants of  the
probability of c-section delivery. If exogeneity of the hospital type dummies is violated, consistent
estimates of these probabilities can only be obtained only by joint modelling of the two latent variables
governing c-section and hospital choice respectively.
Turning to the evaluation of the fee change, having available two repeated cross-sections, a
convenient research tool is the “before and after design” with treated and untreated groups. This
6requires identifying a comparison group not affected by the policy intervention. According to our
theoretical model, a proportional variation in fees - as we observe in our sample- does not lead to any
change in inducement behaviour of fixed budgeted hospitals. Therefore, women deliverying their babies
in public hospitals are excellent candidates to form the comparison group. Our analysis can then be
casted in the framework of natural experiments in economics6. The major advantage of this approach is
the possibility of evaluating the impact of the fee change on private hospitals controlling for concomitant
changes which migth influence all deliveries across the two  years. In the absence of endogeneity of the
hospital type dummy, this could be achieved inserting in the c-section probit equation on the two
pooled cross-sections a dummy variable for the second period. However, the sample selection
mechanism outlined above, if present in both years, would assign women to the treatment group based
on variables determining the probability of c-section delivery thus invalidating the resulting inference.
Following these considerations, we estimate on the two pooled cross-sections a simultaneous
binary choice model, in which the second equation determines the hospital choice. This model
represents the appropriate context in which the hypothesis of exogeneity of hospital type dummies for
the c-section probability parameters can be tested. Since the exogeneity hypothesis can not be
rejected, we are allowed to neglect the destination choice process and focus on the c-section
probability equation in order to evaluate the empirical implications of our theoretical model. We
evaluate the estimated model through the conditional moment approach suggested by Newey (1985),
based on the so-called generalized residuals, and find no evidence against its specification. We
therefore use the implied estimated probabilities to perform a statistical evaluation of the impact of the
fee proportional variation for given class of riskiness and type of hospital.
 We begin, in section 2, by providing some background on c-section delivery, the italian National
Health Service and a brief description of the fees change we analyze in our paper. In section 3 we
present a model that notes the implications of inducement-demand hypothesis for the use of c-section
delivery when fees are reduced proportionally and patients differ in riskiness. Section 4 describes the
data, the empirical specification and testing strategy adopted. Section 5 presents the main results and
section 6 discusses them. Section 7 summarizes and concludes the paper.
                                                
6 For surveys on natural experiment methodology see Meyer (1995) and Rosenzweig and Wolpin
(2000).
72 BACKGROUND ON C-SECTION DELIVERY AND OUR CASE STUDY
2.1 Cesarean section: some preliminary facts
C-section is increasingly adopted. According to OECD data [see Figure 1] we observe a
steadily increase in c-section incidence across the sample, going from 6% in 1970 to more than 20% in
1998. This evidence is only partially consistent with WHO (1985) recommendations on appropriate
technology for birth suggesting that “there is no justification, in any specific geographic region, to have
more than 10-15% c-section births”. Therefore this trend might be only partly interpreted as the
consequence of the adoption of an appropriate technology for birth.
Once we look at some country specific data we do often observe an increase in c-section largely
above the recommended standards. According to Gruber and Owings (1996), for instance, c-section
in the USA increased to above 22% in the 1991. OECD data suggests that c-section adoption
decreased afterwards7. Italy is clearly above this trend, reaching 25% in 1994. This evidence is
confirmed and reinforced by our data. In our sample we find an incidence of about 26% across 1997-
1998. A similar trend is to be found in Portugal and Mexico.
We have several potential explanations for this trend. One relies on a supply driven argument
referring to the introduction and improvement in technologies for diagnosing fetal distress, such as
electronic fetal monitoring [see Williams and Hawes (1979)]. Another potential cause of c-section
adoption relates to the defensive behaviour of obstetricians due to the threat of a malpractice suit [see
Dubay, Kaestner and Waidmann (1999)]. A third explanation refers to a demand driven trend: women
in childbirth tend to increasingly ask for elective c-sections [for a debate on this topic see Paterson-
Brown, Amu, Rajendaran and Bolaji (1998)].
Additional explanations can be found once we look at treatment choices as related to financial
incentives. The cost for a c-section has been calculated in the UK at £668, including preoperative
check (£6), the operation (£118), and a mean 4.2 days in the postnatal ward (£475), while the cost of
inducing labour has been calculated at £644 for a nulliparous woman and £494 for a multiparous
woman, including the induction, intrapartum care with delivery and a mean 2.1 days in the postnatal
ward [see MacKenzie (1999)]. According to these figures, cost differential lies between 5 to 35%.
                                                
7 Das (1997) illustrates the role HMO penetration can have in explaining this reverted trend for the
US.
8Reimbursement differentials tend to exceed cost differentials. Gruber and Owings (1996) suggest that
c-section reimbursement premium is about 63% of natural delivery. In our case study c-section
premium is more than 100% over natural delivery. Since c-section is more generously reimbursed than
natural delivery, obstetricians facing income shocks might induce demand to increase their revenues.
Within this context, Gruber and Owings (1996) suggest that declining fertility led to a substitution
towards cesarean delivery in order to alleviate the income pressure on obstetricians.
Looking at the consequences of c-section adoption the evidence on its effectivness is mixed and
partly inconclusive. Concerning the relationship between c-section and risk for the mothers, Lydon-
Rochelle et al. (2000), conducting a population-based, retrospective cohort analysis, report that c-
section delivery is associated with significantly higher risks of maternal rehospitalization among
primipars without prior identified high-risk medical conditions. Looking at maternal mortality, Lydon-
Rochelle et al. (2001), in a similar empirical framework conclude that c-section might be a marker for
serious preexisting morbities associated with increased mortality risk rather than a risk factor for death
in itself. Hall and Bewley (1999) exhamining direct deaths rates by mode of delivery in the UK show
that the case fatality rate for all cesarean sections is six times that for vaginal delivery and even for
elective c-section the rate is almost three times as great. Routine use of c-section for breech
presentation is widespread. However, poor outcomes after breech birth might be the result of
underlying conditions causing breech presentation rather than damage during delivery. Hannah et al.
(2001), in a randomised trial comparing a policy of planned c-section with a policy of planned vaginal
birth for selected breech-presentation pregnancies, show that there are no differences between groups
in terms of maternal mortality or serious maternal morbidity. In the same study authors provide
evidence of perinatal mortality, neonatal mortality and serious neonatal morbidity being significantly
lower for the planned c-section group than for the planned vaginal birth group.8 However, Ismail et al.
(1999) and Danielian, Wang and Hall (1996), suggest that there is no firm evidence to recommend
systematic elective c-section for breech presentation at term.
                                                
8 In a Cochrane review Hofmeyr and Hannah (2000), having selected randomised trials comparing
planned c-section for breech presentation with planned vaginal delivery, conclude that planned c-section
greatly reduces both perinatal/neonatal mortality and neonatal morbidity, at the expense of somewhat
increased maternal morbidity.
92.2 The italian NHS and delivery procedures9
The italian National Health Service (otherwise known as SSN-Servizio Sanitario Nazionale) was
founded in 1978. It is a universal system that provides comprehensive health insurance coverage and
uniform health care to the entire population. It is mainly financed through general taxation. However,
depending on a citizens income, age and health condition, co-payments are also obligatory for drugs,
ambulatory treatments, certain diagnostic and laboratory tests, and medical appliances.
The SSN is characterised by multiple different levels. At the central level, the Ministry of Health
is responsible for national health planning, financing, general administration, and standards setting. Each
year the Ministry allocates a fixed amount of resources according to a capitation rule to Regional Health
Authorities (RHA). Public funds accruing to the 20 RHAs are then reallocated among approximately
200 Local Health Authorities (LHA) operating in whose territory. Within their given budget, LHAs are
responsible for financing health care consumption of the assisted population, and are partly responsible
for health service production.
The SSN guarantees the provision of hospital treatment at a given level of quality and free of
charge. On the supply side, the SSN largely relies on public production supplemented by privately
licensed hospitals. Public hospitals are run by LHAs or by autonomous public trusts (Aziende
Ospedaliere). They are financed through fixed budget. Privately licensed hospitals can treat patients
within the SSN, i.e. free of charge, and are afterwards refunded by the LHA to which the patient
belongs. Private hospital refunding is based on the prospective payment of each clinical episode.
Clinical episodes are classified according to Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG), a classification scheme
that assigns each episode in one out of 492 codified groups. Each DRG is priced according to the
amount of resource required for its treatment. Actually DRG is an “iso-resource” classification scheme.
Public and private hospitals differ also according to quality and infrastructural capacity. Public hospitals
are well endowed, while private tend to be less equipped. For our case study in delivery, relevant
quality differences across hospital types are the following. With regard to hospital capacity we notice
that public hospitals do have emergency surgical capacity and newborn intensive care units. Private do
not have emergency room and therefore are not allowed to admit on an emergency. If we look at the
style of practice, the presence of teaching personnel could reasonably increase the role of professional
                                                
9 The description we provide here refers to the period covered in our case study. Major reforms
took place thereafter changing the general framework of the National Health Service financing.
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and deontic rewards in the public leading to a higher propensity to improve clinical practices and to
adopt the more appropriate ones.
Patients are completely free to choose the treating hospital; it may be public or privately licensed,
both within or outside their assisting LHA or region. Since patients are totally unaware of treatment
costs, choice is essentially determined by distance from home, hospital specialization, waiting lists, and
perceived quality.
2.3 A proportional reduction in fees for delivery procedures
The progressive reduction of funds accruing to health financing both at regional and local levels
led the RHAs and the LHAs to reform and rationalize their expenditure and production patterns in
order to gain efficiency and reduce costs. Within this framework, between 1997 and 1998 fees for all
delivery procedures where reduced in Emilia-Romagna by 20%. Table 1 provides the impact on total
revenues for each type of hospitals in our case study. Revenues corresponds to outlays for the regional
financing authority. In the Table we show expected reduction in regional outlays assuming that no
substitution between natural and c-section delivery occurs in the meanwhile. Differences across type of
hospitals are explained by small variations in market shares. If we compare these variation with the
effective variation observed in the period we see that outlays reduced less than expected, in particular
because of the relatively large reaction of private hospitals. Within this class of hospitals c-section
revenues reduced by 6% instead of an extrapolated 28%, while natural deliveries contributed more
than projected to the overall reduction in revenues. This aggregate evidence provide a background
justification for our testing strategy of the demand-inducement hypothesis: we aim at testing if this
compositional change in private hospitals in favour of cesarean delivery has been statistically significant.
3 A MODEL OF INDUCED DEMAND
In this section we outline a model of demand induction. It builds on the early work of Newhouse
(1970) and Evans (1974), with extensions to fit our empirical framework.
We look at a representative hospital department admitting women in childbirth. We consider that
women differ in risk. We assume that they are distributed into a discrete number of risk classes denoted
by r, with r=1, …, R. By convention we sort r so that r>s implies that women in class r is riskier that
women in class s. We posit that the hospital department has a utility function of the form:
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where Y represents hospital department full income, earnings minus the value of foregone slack time,
and Ir is the level of inducement on women of risk class r. For the sake of simplicity we assume here
that the department is totally devoted to delivery procedures, i.e. is a specialized department. U'r<0
arises by assuming that, as professionals bound by a code of ethics, physicians derive disutility from
exploiting their agency relation to induce demand. We assume also that the deontic penalty is higher the
lower is patient riskiness, i.e. U's< U'r, with r>s.
Let p denote prospective payment for procedure and f fixed budget. The following model of
induced demand studies p and f separately, identifying the relative magnitudes of their response to a
change in the payment schedule. This change is exogenous and intervenes as a pure negative income
shock. In this respect it resembles to the negative income effects due to a reduction in the stock of birth
used in Gruber and Owings (1996) to identify demand induction. We begin with prospective payment
for procedure.
3.1 Prospective payment for procedure
We follow McGuire and Pauly (1991) assuming additively separable preferences. Let:
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where N is natural childbirths, C is cesarean, YN and YC are the full incomes from performing natural and
c-section deliveries respectively, with YC - YN >0. That is we assume, following Gruber and Owings
(1996), that the reimbursement premium for cesarean deliveries is sufficiently high to compensate the
department for any loss in slack time from performing a c-section. This seems reasonable since
cesarean fees are much higher, cesarean deliveries take less time and the increased difficulty of
cesarean delivery does not compensate for the time reduction. We modify the revenue function to
account for peculiarities in our case study as follows:
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where yN and yC represent DRG weigth for natural and cesarean delivery procedures respectively and T
is the payment due to each unit of DRG weigth.
Let Br represents births by the women of risk class r. We define:
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where ir represents “inducement per birth” by risk class r. This is a costless effort that a physician
exerts to induce demand for a c-section for a given birth of that class; fr(ir) is the inducement function
determining the c-section delivery rate, by risk class r, for each level of inducement effort. We assume
that c-section delivery rate is increasing in inducement effort, i.e. f’r(×)>0. We further assume that
f’’r(×)=0. Since some fraction of births are appropriately diagnosed as requiring c-sections, we assume
fr(0)>0. Moreover, as far as c-section is more frequently appropriate for riskier women it follows that
fr(0)> fs(0), provided that r>s. See panel (a) of Figure 2 for a graphical representation of c-section
delivery rate functions in the case patients belong to two classes of risk, low and high.
The hospital maximizes (2) with respect to ir, subject to (3bis) – (6). The first order conditions
for an internal solution are (suppressing the superscripts):
RriUyTiU rrrrY ,...,1    0)(')('' ="=+Df (7)
where Dy represents (yC-yN). See the panel (b) of Figure 2 for a graphical representation of first order
conditions for the high-low risk case. Therefore hospital physicians trade off the net disutility of
inducement against the net utility from increasing income through shifting to cesarean delivery. In order
to have an internal solution we have to assume that, for any risk class, r, the following hold:
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This means that at a zero level of induction there is a marginal increase in utility from inducement and
that at the level imax, i.e. once a marginal increase in induction does not increase the probability of c-
section, the marginal deontic penalty is larger than the net utility from increasing income through shifting
to cesarean delivery. Notice that, in equilibrium, for any couple of risk classes h and l such that h>l:
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According to our assumption we are not able to establish any well behaved ordering in the equilibrium
levels of induction effort across risk types.
Suppose now that the reimbursement per DRG weight, T, is exogenously reduced. Fully
differentiating (7) we obtain:
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These expressions are strictly negative provided that YUU YYY 1>- , i.e., since 1/Y is approximately
zero, as far as hospital physicians are at least slightly risk adverse. It seems quite resonable to assume
that this condition holds both for public and private hospitals. In this case, therefore, equations (9) state
that an exogenous, proportional decline in delivery procedures tariffs leads to more inducement in any
class of risk. We are now in the position to say something about the relative intensity of these
comparative statics effect across classes of risk. After some algebra and using equation (8) we see that:
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i.e. the increase of inducement effort is decreasing in the degree of patient riskiness provided that the
reduction of marginal utility of inducement - weighted by class frequency -, is increasing in the degree of
patient riskiness.
3.2 Fixed budget
Coming to the fixed budget model the revenue equation becomes:
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where  `y is the capitated DRG weight for a delivery irrespective of the specific mode of delivery
chosen. The first-order conditions obtained maximizing utility subject to the income and births
constraint, as previously defined, show that in this case there is no income-related inducement effect. At
the optimum the fixed budgeted hospital set the inducement effort to zero in order to minimize the
deontic penalty. This implies that, for a given risk profile r, at the optimum fr
p
r ii >  and therefore, as far
as we assume that induction function are the same for the fixed budgeted hospitals, )()( fr
p
r ii ff > . In
the fixed budget case it is trivial to observe that an exogenous, proportional decline in delivery capitated
payment does not lead to any change in inducement.
3.3 Theoretical and empirical implications of our model: overview
In Table 2 we outline the complete set of theoretical implications of our model and figure out the
suitable testing strategies for each of them to be performed in the subsequent empirical analysis.
Comparing to the existing literature we obtain a first set of implications (1) concerning the cross-section
comparison of the marginal productivity of inducement efforts across risk types: the lower is patient
riskiness the higher is the marginal "productivity" of inducement effort on c-section rates [see equation
(8)]. This implication is not suitable for an empirical test, since we do not directly observe inducement
efforts but only c-section rates, which realize according to a set of R unobservable inducement
functions.
A second set of theoretical implications (2) concerns the cross-section probabilities of c-section
across financing incentive schemes: assuming the constancy of induction functions across types of
hospitals we expect c-section rates to be higher when hospitals are payed fee-for-service than when
they are fixed budgeted. This is a well established result in the literature. In our model we generalize it
to the complete set of patient risk classes. This implication is well suited for an empirical test since it
implies a test on predicted probabilities.
Another well established set of theoretical implications concerns the inducement behaviour resulting
from an exogenous income shock (3): negative income shocks lead to an increase in inducement effort
when hospitals are payed fee-for-service, while they don't sort any effect if hospitals are fixed
budgeted. In our model this has to be true irrespective of the patient risk type. We exploit this
implication of the model considering women choosing public hospital as the control group of our
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experiment. The  implication on private hospital is suitable for empirical test as far as we observe c-
section rates differentials across the fee change and we maintain that the induction function is increasing
in the induction effort.
A final set of implications, which is peculiar to our model, is related to the relative magnitude of
the increase in inducement effort across risk classes. Consider a reduction in the marginal utility of
inducement weighted by risk class frequency. If this reduction is increasing with patient riskiness, a
negative income shock will produce an increase in inducement effort which is higher the less risky is the
patient (4a). The reverse occurs if this reduction is decreasing with patient riskiness (4b). Maintaining
that the marginal productivity of induction effort is decreasing in the patient riskiness we are able to
partially test these implications. Two cases might occur. If we observe an increase in c-section rates
which is larger the higher is patient riskiness we can infer that induction effort increased more on the
more risky patient, thus leading to a rejection of 4a in favour of 4b. In the opposite case we cannot
infer anything about the relative increase in induction effort and therefore on the curvature of hospitals’
objective function.
4 EMPIRICAL MODEL
4.1 The data
We work on a sample of women in childbirth residing in Emilia-Romagna and admitted to
regional hospitals for delivery. We excluded from our sample women going private, i.e. paying out-of-
pocket for their hospital admission. Therefore patients are totally price insensitive. Patients going private
are a negligible share of the overall hospital admissions in Italy. This sample refers to women not
previously admitted for delivery within the same time interval. In order to exclude confounding factors
due to the way hospital and health services are organized by LHA, we prefer to work on a sample of
women residing and assisted by only one LHA, i.e. the one of the regional major city, Bologna. This
LHA assists a population of about 900 thousands inhabitants, representing almost 25% of the regional
overall population. Table 3 provides some descriptive evidence on the distribution of c-section delivery
across the two years in our sample.
4.2 The simultaneous binary response model
In order to set up a testing framework for the implications of our theoretical model, we first need
to specify an econometric model to explain the individual probability of c-section delivery. This model
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must be able to predict the differential adoption of c-section delivery across different types of hospitals,
controlling for covariates determining individual riskiness. Different hospitals tend to treat differently the
same patient. This can be due to several factors as financial incentives, professional rewards,
emergency surgical capacity availability.10 Therefore, hospital type effects must be allowed in the
specification of the c-section probability, in the form of both additive and multiplicative hospital type
dummies to measure the differential effects produced by the same individual risk factors across different
hospital types.
However, it can be argued that the hospital type dummies are endogenously determined, as far
as the probability of c-section depends on unobservable variables which are correlated with
unobserved characteristics affecting the hospital choice. This would make estimation of c-section
probability unconsistent. Suppose that private providers are more inclined to treat with the higher
intensity. As far as patients are aware of this, women with unobservable high propensity for c-section
are more likely to select the private hospital. This would lead us to overestimate the private c-section
probability. Similarly, we are likely to underestimate this probability for the public if this is the chosen
destination of women with higher propensity to a natural delivery.
To provide for the above features, we formulate the following simultaneous binary response
model11 for the individual probability of c-section delivery and the choice between private and public
hospital of woman i, i=1…N:
iiiiiiiiii uxhxuzhhzc ++=++++= 1
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10 See also WHO (1985) recommendations suggesting that "natural deliveries after a Cesarean
should normally be encouraged wherever emergency surgical capacity is available".
11 Endogenous dummy models have been firstly indroduced by Heckman (1978). The most relevant
cases in qualitative choice models have then been systematically presented in Maddala's book (1983).
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with c=1 in case of c-section delivery,  h=1 if private hospital is the chosen destination; iz1  is a vector
of individual risk factors, including previous c-section delivery suffered by the woman, breech
presentation of the baby, age and recent hospital admission; iz 2  is a vector of variables which
determine the hospital choice, including, beside some risk factors, the distance from the hospital, and
some characteristics of the town in which the woman resides (see Table 4). Identification of the model
requires that iz 2  does not include all the variables contained in iz1 .
Exogeneity of h in the equation for c* is violated as far 012 ¹r , making estimates of the
parameters of equation (12) unconsistent. On the contrary, if h is found to be exogenously determined,
the joint model can be reduced to the c-section probability equation, which is conditional to the hospital
choice, while equation (13) can be left out from the analysis. Our model in (12) and (13) generalizes
Maddala's model 6 (chapter 5) for simultaneous equations with two binary responses. That model,
which has been recently applied by Holly et al. (1998)12, only considers the additive effect of the one
observed variable on the latent indicator of the other. In order to test the exogeneity of the dummy
variable ( 0: 120 =rH ), we extend Maddala's model by inserting in the first equation the interaction
term involving the endogenous dummy variable and the explanatory variables iz1 . This is an important
generalization whenever it can not be assumed a priori that the first equation explanatory variables do
not have a differentiated impact on the latent dependent variable according to the potentially
endogenous dummy variable indicator. Actually, if 0'1 ¹d , but the interaction term is omitted, the
additive dummy term in equation (12) becomes correlated with the resulting error component. This will
affect the outcome of the exogeneity test and could result in a wrong evaluation of the dummy
exogeneity status.
                                                
12 The objective of their analysis is the joint modelling of health care utilization and health insurance
in Switzerland.
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4.3 Evaluating the impact of the fee changes across the two years
We look at the change in fees as the possible source of a structural break in the parameters of
model (12-13). Having available two independent repeated cross-sections in years 1997 and 1998, a
test of parameter constancy can be performed after their pooling, introducing in both equations a
dummy variable taking value 1 for women delivering their baby in year 1998 (d98). The fee change is
expected to affect only the parameters of the process determining c-section probability conditional on
the chosen hospital. Nevertheless, we need to control for the constancy of the parameters of the
marginal destination process in order to exclude the possibility that variations in the parameters of the
conditional model are brought in by an eventual structural break investing the marginal model
parameters. We keep the model as general as possible and allow both intercept and slope variations in
the regression parts of the latent model, rewriting equations (12) and (13) as:
iiiiiiii uxhdxdxhxc ++++= 1
'
21
'
11
'
21
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1
* 9898 ffJJ (14)
iiii vxdxh ++= 2
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32
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3
* 98fJ (15)
i=1,…N.
The first equation of the above model is a latent dependent variable analogue of the linear
regression model which is commonly used for the evaluation of policy changes with two cross-sections
pooled across time.13  Our model extends this empirical literature by accounting for endogenous
selection of the control group, which  represents one of the major threats to the validity of the
interpretation of the results (see Meyer, 1995, paragraph 2, point 7).
The constancy of the whole set of parameters of the hospital choice model can be evaluated,
after estimation of the above simultaneous model, as a test of the hypothesis:
0: 30 =f
destH ,
while the presence of a structural break on one or both parameter sets of the conditional c-section
probability model amounts to rejection of the corresponding following null hypotheses:
                                                
13 This leads to the so called “difference in differences technique”.
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The first hypothesis is related to possible changes due to technical progress or variation in tastes
investing all delivery procedures across the two years. These are measured on the control group. On
the other hand, the impact of the fee change can be evaluated via the second hypothesis, corresponding
to the treated group of women deliverying in private structures. Notice that evidence in favour of destH0
supports the constancy of the endogenous selection mechanism allocating women in the two kind of
hospitals.14
5 ESTIMATION RESULTS
5.1 Simultaneous probit estimation and exogeneity test
Given the great simplification implied by the exogeneity condition, we start our specification
analysis by estimating the simultaneous model (14 and 15). We use all the available information on risk
factors, inserting all their interactions with fee change and private hospital dummies and with both
dummies, as far as they exhibit sufficiently high non-zero frequency and variability across the delivery
outcome. Table 5 shows estimated coefficients15 and associated heteroskedastic consistent standard
errors of two specifications. In the left-hand side we present the more general one, corresponding to
                                                
14 Ideally, separate estimation on the two years would allow for unconstrained estimate also of the
correlation coefficient of the two stochastic components. We experimented with this possibility, founding
evidence of weak identification of the model. However, it is plausible to assume that the way women
select themselves in a particular kind of hospital remains unchanged in two subsequent years, as far as
they have no information on the ongoing financial reform.
15 Estimation has been performed via numerical maximization using Gauss 3.0 and programming
appropriate code for the likelihood function corresponding to the simultaneous two equation probit and a
for the corresponding analytical first order derivatives (see appendix 2). Analytical computation of the
first order-derivatives reduced considerably the computational time needed by the maximization routine
and made it possible to resort to the Newton algorithm, with numerical evaluation of second order
derivatives based on the provided first-order ones. The algorithm converged in 3 iteration, with an average
time for iteration about equal to 3 minutes on a 1000 Mherz processor computer machine. All the
elements of the gradient vector at maximum are 0 up to the 11-th decimal point.
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equations (14) and (15), which we use to test a number of restrictions. Firstly, having observed that the
coefficients of the age dummies are similar in their absolute value and of contrary sign, we test the
corresponding linear restrictions and find them statistically valid. As a consequence, we replace the two
age dummies with the variable Agedum=age36-age2516 in the c-section equation. Secondly, the
likelihood-ratio test statistic for the hypothesis destH0 is equal to 12.792, which compared with a critical
value of 22.36 (95% critical value of the Chi-square distribution with 13 d.f.) provides strong evidence
in favour of the constant representation of the hospital choice model. In the specification presented in
the right-hand side of the table we impose the abovementioned tested constraints. Notice that the
coefficient of the variable Distance 2 becomes significant, indicating this variable as a relevant
component of opportunity cost in patient hospital choice. Finally the estimated correlation coefficient
turns out to be not significantly different from zero, and the exogeneity hypothesis 0: 120 =rH  can not
be rejected. As a consequence of this result, we reduce our model to equation (14) and focus on the
evaluation of the impact of risk factors, hospital type and fee change on the probability of c-section
delivery.
5.2 Estimation results for the c-section equation
In this second stage of the analysis we focus on the c-section process, and estimate equation
(14) by a simple probit model.17 This is a particularly convenient compact representation for testing the
empirical implications of our theoretical model. The final specification of the model is presented in
Table 6. We first test the hypothesis pubcesH ,0  and can not reject the corresponding exclusion
restrictions. This result is encouraging, as it reveals that no systematic intertemporal changes occured
between the two years in the process determining delivery technology. We expected this finding given
the very short run nature of the policy change we analyse. As a consequence, we exclude from the
model  the block of variables represented by the interactions of risk factors and year 98 dummy. On
the contrary, we reject privcesH ,0 and can not eliminate the analogous block of interactions of the fee
change with private hospital type dummy, mainly do the highly significant coefficient of the private
                                                
16 This variable results equal to -1 for women aged less than 25, 0 for women between 25 and 36
and 1 for women more than 36 years old.
17 We use the numerical maximization routines automatically implemented by STATA 6.0 for single
equation probit estimation.
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hospital type dummy interacted with the fee change indicator. This structural break on the c-section
probability model parameters evidences the significant impact of the financial shock due to the fee
change in hospitals payed fee-for-service. Also, notice the positive and significant coefficients of the
considered risk factors on c-section probability, in agreement with the existing results in the literature.
We leave more extended comments to the next section, where we illustrate our results in terms of
predicted probabilities. Together with the estimation results we provide, in Table 6, some
misspecification tests aimed at examining whether the main assumptions of the model are supported by
the data. We follow the proposal of Newey (1985), reviewed and extended by Pagan and Vella
(1989), and resort to the formulation of different conditional moment restrictions which have to hold if
the model is adequate. Let us rewrite, with obvious compact notation, model (14) as:
iii uwc += '
* b ;
the sample moment condition used to build up diagnostic tests in probit models is characterized as:
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11 )ˆ1(ˆ)ˆ(ˆˆ -- F-FF-= iiiiii yu f
is the generalized residual18 (see Chesher and Irish, 1987 and Gourieroux et al., 1987), (.)f  denotes
the standard normal density function, and hat and subscript i indicate evaluation at iw
'bˆ . Pagan and
Vella show that different choices of iz lead to the following misspecification tests:
· Omitted variables (x): ii xz =
· Heteroscedasticity ))exp(( 2 ii xgs = : )ˆ(
'
iii wxz b=
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and that it is possible to test if statistic that the conditional moments are actually zero, by regressing im
against unity and the scores of observation i and testing if the coefficient of the intercept is zero. The
                                                
18 The generalised residual is an estimate of the expected value )( ii yuE , i.e. the best prediction of
the error term, which would depend on the unobservable dependent variable.
22
results contained in Table 6 generally support the good specification of the estimated model, and the
validity of the inference we want to perform on the implied estimated probabilities.
5.3 Testing the implications of the theoretical model on predicted probabilities
In this section, we focus on predicted probabilities, which are more easily interpretable than the
coefficients themselves, in order to get a more direct feeling of the relative role of the various
explanatory variables in determining the outcome of interest. Our objective is the comparison of the
probability of c-section delivery for reference individuals exhibiting particular values of the exogenous
variables.
Let us stack in one vector the probability of delivering via c-section of two reference women with
vector of characteristics '1w  and 
'
2w  respectively:
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The above quantities can be estimated by using the MLE bˆ . We show in Appendix 3 that asymptotic
normality of bˆ  implies asymptotic normality of the estimated probability vector )ˆ(ˆ bpp =  by virtue of
the Theorem of the Differentiable Transformation. In particular, pˆ  is asymptotically distributed as a
bivariate normal with matrix of variance and covariance { }ijvV = , whose expression is given in the
appendix. The joint distribution of the two estimated probabilities is needed in order to evaluate a test
statistic for the hypothesis 0: 21 =- ppH o , which aims at enlighting wheather the variations induced in
the probability of c-section by variations in the vector of characteristics w  are significantly different
from zero. A test statistic for the above hypothesis is simply given by 12221121 ˆ2ˆˆ)ˆˆ( vvvppS -+-= ,
which is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal.
In the following tables we use this statistical tool to test the various predictions on c-section
probability implied by our theoretical model for different risk levels presented by the woman in
childbirth. We evaluate the estimated probabilities for both years at four different individual risk classes
[for a definition of each class see the footnotes at Tables 7a, b and c].
Starting with implication 2 [Table 7a], we see that for any given risk class the c-section
probability is systematically and significantly higher in private hospitals - financed through tariffs - than in
public ones - which are fixed budgeted - after the proportional fees change; on the contrary we don't
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observe any significant discrepancies before the financing reform. These results are consistent with
implication 2 of our theoretical model.
The main focus of our analysis is to compare c-section probabilities across the fees change [see
Table 7b]. In particular, as far as private hospitals are risk adverse, a proportional reduction in tariffs
for delivery procedures, will result in an increased induction effort. As expected, we observe large and
significant increases in the c-section probability at any level of individual risk for patients admitted to
private hospitals. This result is consistent with implication 3 of our theoretical model.
Coming to implication 4 [see Table 7c] our results suggest that the marginal increase in c-section
probability due to proportional fees reduction is significantly less marked on the more risky type (class
4) compared to the less risky one (class 1 and 2). All the other comparisons turn out to be not
statistically significant. Thus, concerning the relative increase in inducement effort across risk classes,
this evidence is inconclusive, i.e. demand induction could be either more, less or equally pronounced
the more risky is the patient.
6 DISCUSSION
Our analysis provide two sets of results: one about the relationship between patient hospital
choice and demand induction and one about the induction behaviour of risk adverse health service
providers.
We work on a case study where patients can freely choose among a set of hospitals. Hospitals
differ in terms of quality, capacity, style of practice and financing schemes. These aspects indicate the
propensity to choose a type of hospital as a relevant factor for treatment choice. In our empirical
analysis we couldn't assume away that patients might self select into hospitals types according, at least
partially, to treatment behaviour of the providers. In order to account for this we adopt a general
econometric specification where the latent equation determining c-section probability is simultaneously
modelled with the hospital choice latent regression. We then test the hypothesis of exogeneity of the
hospital type dummies for the parameters of the c-section probability and can not reject it. This result,
which leads to a noticeable simplification of the model, is interesting in itself since it suggests that
patients choice of the provider is determined exogenously from hospital treatment and inducement
behaviour. Apparently, hospital choice and treatment choice are not affected by any common set of
unobservable variables. With rational and fully informed patients and given patient preferences on
treatment behaviour, we would expect that exogeneity cannot be accepted. The same would happen if
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treatment and hospital choice were affected by common unobservable individual risk factors.
According to our evidence we have to exclude both. To our knowledge this finding is totally new in the
health economics literature and deserves a more careful investigation than that we conducted here.
Coming to demand induction we provide robust evidence of the presence and magnitude of this
behaviour. According to our estimates, in response to a 20% income shock, c-section adoption
increase of 65% for a low risk woman (type 1) being representative of more than 50% of our sample.
The exact increase of inducement effort cannot be figured out without making assumptions on its
marginal productivity. Anyway, even considering inducement effort extremely productive, we might
conclude that inducement increase is pretty high in the low risk patient. Once we look at a high risk
woman (type 4), representing not more than 3% of the sample, we measure a significantly smaller
increase in c-section probability of about 4%. This evidence does not allow to say anything conclusive
about the relative increase in inducement effort across these two classes of risk. However, according to
our figures, we can observe that the marginal productivity of inducement effort has to be more that 16
times larger in the low risk class than in the high risk one in order to interpret this differential increase in
c-section probability as due to an increase in induction effort that is larger on the higher risk type.
Therefore, provided that the marginal productivity of inducement effort is not so different across types,
it seems that in our sample the income shock produce an increase in inducement that is larger on the
low risk type.
This euristic result have a quite relevant policy implication. The usual policy to control for demand
induction is tariff discrimination, which typically amounts to reducing reimbursement premiums on the
low risk patients. As a first alternative policy measure, consider  increasing patient awarness of
inducement behaviour through health education campaigns. This might reduce the marginal productivity
of inducement leading, coeteris paribus, to a reduction in the equilibrium level of inducement effort for
that class of patients. A similar effect might occur by investing on the deontic penalty physicians might
suffer because of an excess of induction. Our analysis suggests that both policy interventions have to be
mainly targeted to the low risk patients.
7 CONCLUSIONS
The “induced-demand” model, as that of McGuire and Pauly (1991), states that in the face of
negative income shocks, physicians may exploit their agency relationship with patients by providing
excessive care. This misbehaviour, called demand induction, is endemic to the health economy and
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represents one of the more disruptive circumstances for the competitive allocation of resources in this
sector. Despite its paramount relevance there is very little robust evidence in the literature on its extent.
We address this limitation and propose an extended version of the “induced-demand” model that
allows for patient heterogeneity, considering a discrete distribution of patients into classes of risk.
Within this framework we are able to draw new testable implications concerning the relative intensity of
demand induction across risk classes and to test them on sample representative patient types. Our
model is of general interest since it applies whenever a supplier is able to orientate consumers,
according to financial incentive, over a set of partially substitutable "treatments".
We test the model on a sample of delivery choices. Cesarean section and natural delivery are the
alternative technologies for birth the provider might choose. Income shock on the providers is
produced by a natural experiment on fees change. A proportional fee reduction on the two treatments
is observed in our sample. This allows us to evaluate a pure demand induction effect not obscured by
any substitution effect due to the change in relative fees typically examined in the literature.
Our empirical specification adopt a two equations simultaneous probit model in which the
hospital choice is endogenous to the treatment choice equation. This model is of general interest in the
health econometrics literature and could be extensively adopted in similar context of analysis to
investigate the largely ignored relationship between hospital choice and propensity to adopt a given
treatment technology. Acceptance of the exogeneity condition leads to a noticeable simplification of the
model, making the c-section delivery probit formulation conditional on the kind of hospital chosen a
valid tool for the inference about the impact of the fee change. This  can be interpreted as a structural
break on the parameters of the conditional model, whose constancy across the reform can be
statistically evaluated. Thanks to the implications of our theoretical model, public hospital deliveries can
be chosen as the control group, since they are not affected by the particular policy change we analyse.
Our evidence suggests that risk adverse providers overused cesarean delivery for all profiles of
individual risk considered, relative to the level that would be chosen by a financially disinterested
provider. The magnitude of the effect has never been so clearly spotted in the literature before. We
don't find any clear evidence of demand induction being more marked the less risky is the patient.
However, this is a reasonable implication provided that the marginal productivity of inducement effort is
not disproportionately higher in the low risk type comparing to the high risk one.
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8 APPENDIX 1
Table A1: Descriptive statistics for the c-section equation variables.
Full sample Natural delivery C-section delivery
N° obs.  = 10343 N° obs.  = 7643 N° obs.  = 2700
Private 4.7% 4.6% 4.9%
Fee change 50.0% 49.8% 50.3%
Age25 8.8% 9.8% 5.8%
Age36 17.5% 15.3% 23.5%
Previous 20.2% 18.5% 25.2%
Prior 7.0% 1.0% 24.3%
Breech 4.8% 0.3% 17.6%
Table A2: Descriptive statistics for the c-section equation variables.
Public hospitals Private hospitals
1997 1998 1997 1998
Variable N° obs.  = 4921 N° obs.  = 4938 N° obs.  = 255 N° obs.  = 229
Age25 8.9% 8.8% 7.8% 6.1%
Age36 17.8% 17.2% 17.3% 16.2%
Prior 6.9% 7.3% 7.1% 5.7%
Breech 4.6% 5.1% 5.1% 4.8%
Previous 20.6% 20.8% 10.6% 10.0%
C-section 26.1% 26.1% 23.9% 30.6%
Table A3: Descriptive statistics for the hospital choice equation variables.
Women NOT residing in BOLOGNA Women residing in BOLOGNA
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
N° obs.  = 6985 N° obs.  = 3358
Age 31.12 4.58 15.23 46.32 32.40 4.93 16.64 47.23
Car 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.0 0.04 0.04
Distance 1 16.1 11.6 0.0 63.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Distance 2 28.5 15.9 6.0 78.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Travelled Dist. 23.2 17.0 0.0 132.0 2.07 10.6 0.0 117.0
Population 19.1 18.6 1.2 64.0 384.5 0.7 383.8 385.1
Elderly 1.60 0.38 0.87 3.1 2.801 0.000 2.801 2.801
Mean Income 24898 2768 17707 31515 31032 173 30854 31200
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9 APPENDIX 2
For ease of exposition, we report the log-likelihood of the simultaneous model in 12 and 13. The
log-likelihood of model corresponding to 14 and 15 has the same form, but includes among the
explanatory variables also the dummies corresponding to the fee change.
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and )(.,.; 12rF  is the joint normal distribution function of the model error terms ),( ii vu .
The first order derivatives of the above log-likelihood function with respect to the parameters
can then be evaluated by resorting to the following formula, which provides first order derivatives of the
bivariate normal density function generally expressed as [ ]rgg );(),( 2211 aaF :
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10 APPENDIX 3
Asymptotic normality of maximum likelihod estimator, bˆ  is a standard result. In our probit
model, the parameter vector dimension is equal to K and we have:
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where 0b  is the value of the parameter which maximize the limit likelihood function.
We can obtain the asymptotic distribution of the estimated probabilities by recognizing them as a
differentiable function of the MLE bˆ . More precisely, we want to write down the joint asymptotic
distribution of two particular such probabilities, corresponding to different reference individuals.
With the notation of section 4.5, let us regard )(bp as a function [ ]21,0: ®KRp :
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and that the rank of )( 0
' bp  is equal to 2, we can apply the Theorem of the differentiable
transformation and get the result:
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The finite sample counterparts of the elements of V can then be consistently estimated by:
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where Sˆ  is a consistent estimate of S .
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 FIGURES
Figure 1: The incidence of C-section in OECD coutries. Cesarean-sections per 1000 live
birth.
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Source: Our elaborations on OECD Health Data, 2000. The OECD average is calculated as a simple mean of the
following countries rates: Belgium, Czech Rep., Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Mexico, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K.,USA.
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Figure 2: Graphical rapresentation of equilibria with two classes of risk: L (low) and H (high).
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TABLES
Table 1: Variation of revenues from delivery procedures. 1998-1997. Values expressed in
Euro.
1997 1998
Effective %
variation
Extrapolated
% variation
Public hospitals C-section deliveries 1,981,690  1,609,742 -18.8%
Natural deliveries  2,862,316  2,287,956 -20.1%
All deliveries  4,844,006  3,897,698 -19.5% -19.7%
Private hospitals C-section deliveries       86,944       81,344 -6.4%
Natural deliveries     140,795       92,315 -34.4%
All deliveries     227,738     173,659 -23.7% -27.9%
Table 2: Theoretical and empirical implication of our demand-induction model.
Theoretical implications Empirical test
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Table 3: C-section rates and patient distributions across hospital types in our sample.
Hospital type
PUBLIC PRIVATE TOTAL
C-section rates 1997 25.4% 23.3% 25.3%
1998 25.7% 30.3% 25.9%
Pooled 25.6% 26.6% 25.6%
Market shares
1997 95.0% 5.0% 100.0%
1998 95.5% 4.5% 100.0%
Pooled 95.3% 4.7% 100.0%
Table 4: Variable description
Mnemonics Description
Age25 =1 if the woman is younger than 25;
=0 otherwise
Age36 =1 if the woman is older than 36;
=0 otherwise
Prior* =1 if the woman had a previous c-section;
=0 otherwise
Breech** =1 if the woman presents breech, malpresentation, or malposition;
=0 otherwise
Previous =1 if the woman was admitted to hospital within 90 days from delivery;
=0 otherwise
Cesarean =1 if the woman delivers with c-section
=0 otherwise
Private =1 if the woman is admitted to private hospital
=0 otherwise
Fee change (d98) =1 if the woman delivers her baby after the fee change (1998)
=0 otherwise
Age Age of the woman
Agesq Age squared/100
Distance 1 Minimum distance (in km.) from homeplace to public hospital
Distance 2 Minimum distance (in km.) from homeplace to private hospital
Travelled dist. Distance (in km.) from homeplace to admitting hospital
Car % of high powered car in the residing town
Hill =1 if the town lies 200 meters above the sea level
=0 otherwise
Not Bologna =1 if woman does not reside in the main town (Bologna)
=0 otherwise
Population Number of inhabitants of the residing town/1000
Populationsq Pop squared/1000
Mean income Mean gross income in the residing town/1000 italian lira
Elderly % of elderly (>65) in the population of the residing town
*Prior cesarean is indicated in the hospital discharge record by ICD-9 codes of 654.2x, "uterine scar from previous
surgery". **Breech, other malpresentation, or malposition is indicated in the discharge record by ICD-9 diagnosis
codes of 652.xx or procedure codes 72.5x [see Keeler, et al. 1997].
Table 5: Simultaneous probit model
Variables Coefficient Stand. error Significance Coefficient Stand. Error Significance
Cesarean section equation Cesarean section equation
Age25 -0.29275 0.08283 ¨¨¨
Age36 0.25401 0.05493 ¨¨¨
Agedum 0.26591 0.04241 ¨¨¨
Prior 2.11227 0.09389 ¨¨¨ 2.11457 0.09393 ¨¨¨
Breech 2.52396 0.13846 ¨¨¨ 2.52347 0.13830 ¨¨¨
Previous 0.25634 0.05192 ¨¨¨ 0.25583 0.05191 ¨¨¨
Private -0.02647 0.19959 -0.01570 0.18986
Age25*Private 0.38196 0.35983
Age36*Private -0.17643 0.24928
Agedum*Private -0.25202 0.19648
Previous*Private 0.55810 0.29595 ¨ 0.55114 0.29526 ¨
Fee change -0.02712 0.04035 -0.01848 0.03671
Age25*Fee change 0.14975 0.11697
Age36*Fee change -0.06643 0.07866
Agedum*Fee change -0.09375 0.06107
Prior*Fee change 0.08304 0.13368 0.07993 0.13379
Breech*Fee change 0.02445 0.19405 0.02571 0.19358
Previous*Fee change 0.02393 0.07347 0.02453 0.07347
Private*Fee change 0.33862 0.17186 ¨¨¨ 0.33769 0.15433 ¨¨¨
Age25*Private*Fee change -0.38161 0.55044
Age36*Private*Fee change 0.46061 0.37614
Agedum*Private*Fee change 0.46294 0.30646
Previous*Private*Fee change -0.56633 0.43242 -0.57337 0.43006
Constant -1.00873 0.02944 ¨¨¨ -1.01198 0.02675 ¨¨¨
Hospital choice equation Hospital choice equation
Age 0.10521 0.06965 0.12055 0.05210 ¨¨¨
Age Sq -0.17267 0.11105 -0.18761 0.08328 ¨¨¨
Prior 0.05895 0.13634 -0.03330 0.10102
Breech 0.10970 0.15201 0.09624 0.11205
Previous -0.37481 0.09978 ¨¨¨ -0.36820 0.07349 ¨¨¨
Pop*NB -0.09789 0.01508 ¨¨¨ -0.09663 0.01165 ¨¨¨
PopSq*NB 1.68212 0.20612 ¨¨¨ 1.68882 0.15831 ¨¨¨
Distance 1 0.00274 0.00471 0.00136 0.00336
Distance 2 -0.00729 0.00470 -0.00810 0.00370 ¨¨¨
Hill -0.52277 0.21026 ¨¨¨ -0.46862 0.16333 ¨¨¨
Car*NB 19.90589 8.09944 ¨¨¨ 20.48587 5.92265 ¨¨¨
NB 0.44347 0.38204 0.36253 0.28727
Age*Fee change 0.04702 0.10415
Age Sq*Fee change -0.05215 0.16642
Prior*Fee change -0.21149 0.20197
Breech*Fee change -0.02925 0.22394
Previous*Fee change 0.00193 0.14750
Pop*NB*Fee change 0.00268 0.02382
PopSq*NB*Fee change 0.02091 0.32323
Distance 1*Fee change -0.00224 0.00655
Distance 2*Fee change -0.00220 0.00758
Hill*Fee change 0.11916 0.33490
Car*NB*Fee change 2.66297 11.86929
NB*Fee change -0.22516 0.58101
Fee change -0.94711 1.61567
Constant -3.47532 1.08471 ¨¨¨ -3.80363 0.80815 ¨¨¨
12rˆ -0.07288 0.08852 -0.06478 0.08739
Number of observations 10343 10343
Zero outcomes 7643
Nonzero outcomes 2700
Log likelihood -6066.877 -6073.27
¨¨¨ ,¨¨ ,¨  denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
Table 6: probit model estimates – c-section equation
Variables Coefficient Stand. error Significance
Agedum 0.21937 0.03052 ¨¨¨
Prior 2.15452 0.06684 ¨¨¨
Breech 2.53733 0.09675 ¨¨¨
Previous 0.26583 0.03675 ¨¨¨
Private -0.13537 0.11079
Agedum*Private -0.21564 0.19440
Previous*Private 0.52302 0.29259 ¨¨
Fee change -0.01823 0.03047
Private*Fee change 0.35045 0.15336 ¨¨¨
Agedum*Private*Fee change 0.35421 0.29867
Previous*Private*Fee change -0.54598 0.42317
Constant -1.006 0.02376 ¨¨¨
Number of observations 10343
Zero outcomes 7643
Nonzero outcomes 2700
Wald chi2(10) 1759.71
Log likelihood -4525.27
Prob > chi2 0.000
Pseudo R2 0.238
Misspecification Test t-statistic
Omitted variables
Elderly index 0.9449
Mean income -0.2656
Travelled Distance 0.6159
Car*NB -0.1150
NB -0.0367
Normality
Square predict. -1.4325
Cubic predict. -1.7125
Heteroscedasticity
Agedum 0.5994
Age -0.4030
Agesq -0.5567
Prior -1.6345
Breech -0.3393
Previous -2.4195
Private -0.2045
Fee change -0.2982
Private*Fee change -0.7455
Travelled Distance -0.9146
¨¨¨ ,¨¨ ,¨  denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 7a: Predicted c-section probabilities and test statistic on probabilities change:
implication 2.
HOSPITAL PUBLIC PRIVATE DIFFERENCE TEST
Risk Class Fixed budget Tariffs
1997 1 0.157 0.127 -0.030 -1.307
2 0.875 0.845 -0.030 -1.144
3 0.914 0.845 -0.069 -1.477
4 0.937 0.919 -0.019 -1.101
1998 1 0.153 0.209 0.056 1.852
2 0.871 0.911 0.040 2.247
3 0.911 0.956 0.044 1.931
4 0.935 0.958 0.023 2.267
Table 7b: Predicted c-section probabilities and test statistic on probabilities change for
hospital financed through tariffs: implication 3a.
Risk Class 1997 1998
T
i
r
¶
¶ )(f
TEST
% increase
1 0.127 0.209 -0.412 -2.198 65%
2 0.845 0.911 -0.331 -2.127 8%
3 0.845 0.956 -0.552 -2.139 13%
4 0.919 0.958 -0.197 -2.007 4%
Table 7c: Predicted c-section probabilities and test statistic on probabilities change for
hospital financed through tariffs: implication 4.
1 2 3
2 -0.016
-1.129
3 0.028 0.044
0.505 0.857
4 -0.043 -0.027 -0.071
-1.913 -1.871 -1.420
* Risk class=4 refers to a woman with age between 25 and 36 and breech presentation; risk class=3 refers to a woman
with age>36 and with a prior cesarean; risk class=2 refers to a woman with age between 25 and 36 and a prior
cesarean; finally, risk class=1 refers to a woman with no risk factor.  Classes account for 52.7% (class 1), 3.3% (class
2), 1.6% (class 3), 2.6% (class 4) of the sample.
